Deal for uranium, not reactors?
Contrary to what the communists say, the Indo-US civilian nuclear energy agreement is not really about boosting US nuclear reactor sales, reports Wall Street Journal. US companies may not be all that eager to do business with India until it establishes a sufficient amount of Indian nuclear damage
liability coverage, it says. Given India's horrific experience with the
American-built Union Carbine chemical-plant accident at Bhopal, when
this will occur is anybody's guess, it adds.
The Journal then goes on to say:
All of which raises the question, if this "peaceful"
nuclear deal isn't to pump up U.S. reactor sales, just what is it
about? One could argue that India could use more foreign uranium. It's
recently run so low on domestic fuel that it's had to reduce the power
production level of its civilian reactors significantly. It also needs
foreign uranium because its own uranium production has remained
relatively flat, while its civilian and military requirements have
risen.This is where the trouble begins. It turns out that
fuelling India's civilian reactors with foreign fuel is not all that
peaceful. As K. Subrahmanyam, former head of India's National Security
Advisory board noted, "Given India's uranium ore crunch . . . it is to
India's advantage to categorize as many power reactors as possible as
civilian ones to be refueled by imported uranium and conserve our
native uranium fuel for weapons grade plutonium production."India, however, doesn't need more weapons to keep up
with Pakistan; it needs more and better ones to match China. That's why
India has been developing intercontinental range ballistic missiles --
weapons that could use more, smaller, lighter, efficient advanced
thermonuclear warheads. This, in turn, is why India's hawks are so
interested in resuming nuclear testing.
The Journal adds:
The U.S. certainly should not finalize
the deal until either India agrees it should stop upgrading its arsenal
significantly or we clearly decide that we no longer care if it does.
But as India's Hindustan Times reports:
The 123 agreement, unveiled yesterday, is silent on
nuclear testing by India but makes it clear that the pact will not
hinder or hamper New Delhi's military nuclear programme.The 40-year agreement, extendable by 10 years, commits the US to
ensure uninterrupted fuel supplies to Indian reactors."Either party (country) shall have the right to terminate this
agreement prior to its expiration on one year's written notice to the
other party," says the 22-page text of the pact reached last month.
Going by newspaper reports, this is the best deal India could get.
The Wall Street Journal says the Bush administration is so keen on the agreement that:
The U.S. actually has been twisting arms at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, threatening to
leave and so dissolve the group if countries critical of the India deal
did not fall into line on India.
Indian communists will of course continue opposing any agreement with the US. But the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party is surely being bloodyminded in opposing the deal, claiming it will undermine the Indian nuclear weapons programme.
The Wall Street Journal says:
In the next few weeks, India is also expected to
submit a safeguards agreement before the IAEA Board of Governors in
Vienna. India will make a unilateral statement aimed at reserving its
right to expel IAEA inspectors from reactor sites if the U.S., or other
fuel suppliers, suspend nuclear fuel shipments for any reason --
including Indian resumption of testing. Indian officials are also
likely to plead for nuclear fuel supply guarantees so the country can
stockpile uranium fuel against future nuclear fuel supplier cutoffs
that might occur -- again, following a future nuclear test. If, as
expected, no IAEA board member or NSG country objects to these Indian
statements, India will construe the silence as assent.
The U.S. State Department is quite aware of these
views. It's a key reason why late last year, State pleaded with the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs not to release the Department's
unclassified answers to whether or not the Executive believed the deal
required the U.S. to cut off nuclear supplies to India if it tests; if
the Department thought India could stockpile U.S. nuclear fuel to
reduce U.S. influence on Indian nuclear testing policies; and precisely
what kind of safeguards India must agree to. Oddly, the Committee
agreed to keep State's answers under wraps. This suggests American
diplomats want India to think it can test with impunity while it is
telling Congress India can't.